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GOLAN V. HOLDER, THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE, AND
THE CHANGING PUBLIC POLICY UNDERLYING
COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
JOHN J. SIEROTNIK*
INTRODUCTION
On January 18, 2012, many of the most popular sites on the
Internet, including Google, Wikipedia, and Craigslist, blacked out their
home pages in protest over the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA).1  They
argued that SOPA, a law strongly supported by the copyright lobby,
imposed too high a burden on the Internet and gave the government
too many powers in the fight against piracy.  The protest was highly
successful in raising public awareness of the bill, which soon lost con-
gressional support.2  The copyright lobby ultimately lost the battle over
SOPA, but the very same morning of the protest, it scored a major vic-
tory in the Supreme Court.  In one of the most significant decisions on
copyright law it has ever handed down, the Court ruled that Congress
has the power to remove works from the public domain and enable
rights holders to commercially exploit what had previously been availa-
ble to the public at no charge.3
The controversy surrounding Golan was nearly twenty years in the
making.  It traces its origin to March 1, 1989, when the United States
joined the Berne Convention, an international agreement for the pro-
tection of intellectual property.4  One of the chief principles of the
Convention is reciprocity for copyrights.5  As Justice Ruth Bader Gins-
burg stated, Congress “punted” on a key issue of the Convention, Arti-
cle 18, when it passed the initial legislation implementing the treaty in
1988, the Berne Convention Implementation Act (BCIA).6  Article 18
of the Convention extends its protections to all foreign works that have
not fallen into the public domain due to the expiry of a term of copy-
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2014; B.A., Catholic University, 2005.  I
would like to thank Colleen Walter for her encouragement throughout the composition
process and my parents for their love and support throughout my educational career.
1. Haley Tsukayma & Sarah Halzack, Internet Blackouts Appear to have Desired Effect,
WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2012, at A11.
2. Id.
3. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
4. Marshall Leaffer, International Copyright from an American Perspective, 43 ARK. L.
REV. 373, 379 (1990) (The U.S. was the last major western country to join the
Convention).
5. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 18, Sept.
9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 251 (Article 18 grants protections to works that “have not yet fallen
into the public domain in the country of origin” but excludes works that “through the
expiry of the term of protection” have “fallen into the public domain of the country
where protection is claimed.”).
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right protection.7  Because there were many works by Berne signatory
nations that were never subject to copyright protection in the United
States due to a lack of copyright protection for works from their country
of origin, the medium of the work, or a failure to comply with the then
existing formalities under copyright law, the U.S. implementation of
the Berne Convention was incomplete.8  Following the Uruguay Round
of trade agreements in 1994, Congress passed the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act (URAA), which finally addressed the issue of these
works.9  This Act restores copyrights to a broad class of works that for a
number of reasons were never subject to copyright protection in the
United States.10  As a result of the URAA taking effect, copyright pro-
tection was restored to things as diverse as troll dolls, the never-ending
staircases drawn by M. C. Escher, and Prokofiev’s Peter and the Wolf.11
The passage of the URAA particularly affected symphony orches-
tras because they are one of the greatest utilizers of the public domain.
For works not subject to copyright protection, they can obtain sheet
music for a mere hundred dollars and perform the pieces freely without
any need for licensing fees.12  Copyrighted works, however, may require
fees of over ten thousand dollars.13  This dramatic increase in costs
presented a significant obstacle to orchestras.  At the time Congress
passed the URAA, eighty-seven percent of orchestras had a total budget
of less than $750,000.14  Because of the substantial financial burden,
many small, struggling orchestras stopped programming these works,
depriving many communities of the opportunity to hear them live until
they reverted to the public domain.15
In the fall of 2001, a broad collation of musicians and distributors
of classical music led by conductor Lawrence Golan filed suit in the
District of Colorado, claiming the grant of copyrights to works in the
public domain afforded by § 514 of the URAA was unconstitutional.16
The suit would take over a decade to resolve as it worked its way up and
down the federal court system, culminating in oral arguments in the
7. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supra note 5,
at art. 18.
8. Golan, 132 S. Ct at 877–78.
9. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103–465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4809,
4976–81 (1994).
10. Id.
11. Tresa Baldas, Trolling for Rights; Suit over Dolls Turns on Whether Work Once In
Public Domain Later Can Be Protected, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., Sept. 21, 2004, at 4.
12. Marty Jones, Bitter Suite, DENVER WESTWORD MUSIC (May 2, 2002), http://www.
westword.com/2002-05-02/music/bitter-suite/full/, cited in Brian Lee Pelanda, Note, Cop-
yright’s “Traditional Contours” and “Bedrock Principles”: Golan’s Potential to Secure First Amend-
ment Protection over the Public Domain, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 547 (2010).
13. Jones, supra note 12.
14. Catherine Wichterman, The Orchestra Forum: A Discussion of Symphony Orchestras
in the US, ANDREW W. MELLON FOUND. (Feb 27, 2013, 12:54 PM), http://www.mellon.org/
news_publications/annual-reports-essays/presidents-essays/the-orchestra-forum-the-
orchestra-forum-a-discussion-of-symphony-orchestras-in-the-us.
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Supreme Court on October 5, 2011.17  In the interim, the Supreme
Court decided another significant copyright case, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
which had a substantial influence on its holding in Golan.18  Finally, on
January 18, 2012, as the Internet was protesting what it viewed as a dra-
conian new copyright law, the Supreme Court delivered a crushing
blow to the musicians and upheld the constitutionality of § 514 of the
URAA.19  This decision was widely criticized from rights groups, such as
the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and various legal commenta-
tors.20
The decision reached by the Supreme Court in Golan v. Holder,
while appearing to be a marked departure from statutory law and case
law, is surprisingly consistent with precedent and the most recent
trends.  Part I of this Note explores the history of our current copyright
regime from its origins in the English Reformation to the Sony Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 and the URAA of 1994.  Part II
will explain the musicians’ arguments that § 514 of the URAA is uncon-
stitutional and why the Supreme Court ultimately rejected them.  Part
III looks at how this decision fits in against the changing policy and
historical norms underlying United States copyright law.  Part IV con-
siders how this decision impacts the future of the public domain.
I. ORIGINS OF AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW
The history of copyright in the English-speaking world predates
the first English settlement in what would become the United States by
nearly one hundred years.21  The first restrictions on printing grew out
of the turmoil of the English Reformation.  Henry VIII’s Catholic
daughter, Queen Mary I, established the Stationers’ Company, a guild
of printers organized to “prevent the propagation of the Protestant Ref-
ormation.”22  Following Mary’s death, her successor Elizabeth I re-
established the Church of England.23  Over time, the Stationers’ Com-
pany gained a monopoly on printing and grew in power.24  The com-
pany allowed members to register a particular work with the guild and
17. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
18. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (holding the Copyright Term Extension
Act of 1988 did not violate the constitutional requirement that copyrights endure for
limited times and that the Copyright Term Extension Act did not violate plaintiff’s First
Amendment rights).
19. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878.
20. Corynne McSherry, Supreme Court Gets it Wrong in Golan v. Holder, Public Domain
Mourns, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 23, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2012/01/supreme-court-gets-it-wrong-golan-v-holder-public-domain-mourns. See also
James Boyle & Jennifer Jenkins, Public by Sufferance Alone: The Worst of 2012, HUFFINGTON
POST (Jan. 10, 2013 8:51 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-boyle/public-by-
sufferance-alon_b_2443850.html.
21. Jamestown was founded in 1607. KENNETH MORGAN, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF
BRITAIN 720 (2001).
22. EATON DRONE, A TREATISE IN THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUC-
TIONS 55–56 (1879).
23. Morgan, supra note 21, at 302–03.
24. DRONE, supra note 22, at 55–56 n.1 (noting that a 1585 decree required printers
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received exclusive rights to publish it perpetually.25  Those who contra-
vened the ordinance were subject to arrest and destruction of the
offending books by the members of the Company.26  Parliament codi-
fied many of the powers granted to the Stationer’s Company with the
Licensing Act of 1662.27  The Act was renewed several times, but Parlia-
ment eventually allowed it to permanently lapse in 1694.28
Following a brief period where anyone could freely print anything,
the members of the Stationers’ Company lobbied Parliament to pass a
new copyright statute.29  In response, Parliament passed the Statute of
Anne in 1710.30  Unlike during the Stationers’ Company’s earlier
monopoly on all printing, this Statute vested the rights to works in the
authors directly.31  Authors enjoyed the exclusive right to designate a
printer or printers to publish their work for a term of fourteen years
with another renewal for the same term of years.32  Following the expi-
ration of the term, books were freely printable by anyone.  The stated
purpose of this Act was the very utilitarian “Encouragement of Learn-
ing,” accomplished “by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the
Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
mentioned.”33
The influence of the Statute of Anne on early American copyright
law is very apparent.  The text of the Copyright Clause of the Constitu-
tion, “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries,” shares many similarities with the
English statute.34  Additionally, the first copyright statute enacted
under the Constitution, the Copyright Act of 1790, protected works for
the same term as the Statute of Anne: fourteen years with an option to
renew for an additional fourteen years.35  It is important to note that
this initial copyright Act only protected works created by citizens or per-
manent residents; foreign works received no such protection.36  This
Act, like the Statute of Anne, also mandated certain formalities, namely
25. Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past
and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 398 (2004).
26. DRONE, supra note 22, at 55–56.
27. Id. at 57–58.
28. Id.
29. Craig Joyce, Prologue: The Statute of Anne: Yesterday and Today, 47 HOUS. L. REV.
779, 782 (2010).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 783; Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, c. 19 (1710)
32. Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, c. 19 (1710) (“[A]nd that the Author of any Book or
Books already Composed and not Printed and Published, or that shall hereafter be Com-
posed, and his Assignee, or Assigns, shall have the sole Liberty of Printing and Reprinting
such Book and Books for the Term of fourteen years”).
33. Id.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  I will argue, however that there are also some key
differences, infra at note 92.
35. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
36. Id. at § 1 (“And that the author and authors of any map, chart, book . . . . being
a citizen or citizens of these United States, or resident therein . . . shall have the sole right
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registration and filing.37  The exclusion of foreign works and required
formalities for statutory copyright protection would later be a source of
tension as works went unprotected.
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Congress
amended or completely overhauled the copyright acts several times.
Many revisions extended the duration of the copyright term.  Initially,
in 1831, Congress extended the term to a maximum of forty-two
years;38 in 1909, they extended it to fifty-six years.39  In 1976, Congress
abandoned a term of a fixed number of years and changed the term to
the life of the author plus fifty years.40  In 1998, Congress further
extended the copyright term to the life of the author plus seventy years
by passing the Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA).41
Alongside lengthening the term, the various acts also extended the
reach of copyrights to keep up with the developments of modern tech-
nology.  Additionally, in 1891, Congress amended the Copyright Act to
grant protection to citizens of foreign states whose countries afforded
adequate protections to American works, as determined by the Presi-
dent of the United States.42
In addition to its English heritage, American copyright law has in
recent years come to be shaped by international concerns.  In the late
nineteenth century, the Swiss government convened an international
conference to address copyrights in Berne.43  While the Swiss govern-
ment invited the United States to the conference, the Americans ulti-
mately declined to adopt the resulting agreement, the Berne
Convention, because it was incompatible with existing United States law
which did not protect works of foreign authors at the time.44  Addition-
ally, the Berne Convention plainly stated that its focus was on protect-
ing the rights of the authors and not utilitarian concerns.45
Over the next century, an additional sixty-seven countries would
join the Berne Convention and the United States faced increasing inter-
37. Id. at § 3.
38. Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.  Additionally, this Act required notice
of the copyright to be printed on the work. Id.
39. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
40. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
41. Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998).
42. International Copyright Act of 1891, Ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106. This resulted in
reciprocity with Belgium, Great Britain, France, and Switzerland in 1891, Proclamation
No. 3, 27 Stat. 981 (July 1, 1891); Germany and Italy in 1892, Proclamation No. 24, 27
Stat. 1021, 1043 (April 15, 1892); Denmark and Portugal in 1893, Proclamation No. 1, 28
Stat. 1219 (May 8, 1893); Proclamation No. 4, 28 Stat. 1222 (July 20, 1893), Spain in 1895,
Proclamation No. 5, 29 Stat. 871 (July 10, 1895); and Mexico and Chile in 1896, Procla-
mation No. 10, 29 Stat. 877 (Feb. 27,1896); Proclamation No. 13, 29 Stat. 880 (May 25,
1896).
43. Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the Future, 3 J.L.
& TECH. 1, 12 (1988).
44. Orrin G. Hatch, Better Late than Never: Implementation of the 1886 Berne Convention,
22 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 171, 174 (1989).
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national pressure to join.46  In particular, foreign countries would cite
the United States’ lack of membership in the Berne Convention as
being hypocritical during negotiations over piracy.47  Due to disagree-
ments with the underlying policy of the agreement and the incongruity
of the terms of the Convention with the then-existing American copy-
right law, the United States continued to resist joining the Conven-
tion.48  However, in response to the international pressure and
following modifications to American copyright law that were more com-
patible with the terms of the Convention, the United States passed the
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 198849 and ultimately joined
the Berne Convention.50
Although, the United States officially joined the Berne Conven-
tion, additional changes to the law were necessary to fully adopt the
Convention. The changes came about in the legislation implementing
the results of the Uruguay round of international trade agreements.51
The Act passed to implement the agreement, the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act (URAA), had the effect of restoring copyright protec-
tion to works under copyright in their home country that had fallen
into the public domain in the United States for one of three reasons.52
First, the law restored protection if the work was in the public domain
due to a failure to comply with United States formalities such as provid-
ing notice of the claimed copyrights.53  Second, it granted copyright
protection if the law, at the time a work was created, did not protect its
subject matter, but later did.54  Lastly, the URAA restored copyrights if
the reason the work was in the public domain was that the United States
did not afford copyright protection to works created in its country of
origin.55
II. GOLAN V. HOLDER
A. The Road to the Supreme Court
In the fall of 2001, a group of musicians filed suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado challenging the consti-
tutionality of both the Uruguay Round Agreement Acts (URAA) and
the Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA).56  This case
would be placed on hold for two years as the district court stayed the
46. Hatch, supra note 44, at 171, 178.
47. Id. at 178.
48. Burger, supra note 43, at 68.
49. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-658, 102 Stat.
2853.
50. Hatch, supra note 44, at 171–72.
51. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 877 (2012).
52. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103–465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
53. Id. at § 514.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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proceedings while the Supreme Court ruled on a nearly identical claim
challenging the constitutionality of the CTEA.57
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court considered whether the
CTEA unconstitutionally extended the length of the copyright term for
existing works.58  The CTEA was challenged on the grounds that it vio-
lated both the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment.59  Writing
for the majority, Justice Ginsburg upheld the constitutionality of the
law, the reasoning of which would come to strongly influence the out-
come of Golan. Citing a long history of term extensions for both copy-
rights and patents, she held that extending the copyright term of
existing works did not violate the Copyright Clause’s requirement that
the term be limited.60  The CTEA was also found to be a rational exer-
cise of legislative power because Congress desired to extend the U.S.
copyright term to be on par with that of European nations.  This
insured that American authors were not at a competitive disadvantage
compared to their European counterparts.61  The Court noted that it is
the role of Congress, not the Court, to determine how to best pursue
the goals of the Copyright Clause.62  Perhaps most importantly, they
held that conformity with those goals was to be considered in the con-
text of the entire intellectual property regime.63
Following the Court’s decision in Eldred, the district court dis-
missed the musicians’ claim against the CTEA.64  The musicians’
remaining three claims concerned the constitutionality of § 514 of the
URAA that restored copyright protection to works previously in the
public domain.  They first argued that Congress lacked the power to
remove works from the public domain because doing so did not meet
the constitutional mandate to “promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.”65  They relied on both the history of copyright legislation
and an earlier decision in a patent case, Graham v. John Deere Co.,66 to
support their claim that Congress lacked the necessary authority.67
Their second argument was that § 514 of the URAA inhibited their
right to free speech under the First Amendment because they lost the
ability to freely publish works that have had their copyrights restored.68
They distinguished their claim from the holding in Eldred, which held
that First Amendment scrutiny is not necessary, by claiming that in
removing works from the public domain, the URAA upset “the tradi-
tional contours of copyright protection.”69  Finally, the musicians
57. Id. at 1217.
58. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
59. Id. at 196.
60. Id. at 204.
61. Id. at 205–06.
62. Id. at 212.
63. Id. at 222.
64. Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1218 (D. Colo. 2004).
65. Id. at 1218.
66. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
67. Golan, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 1219.
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claimed that their Fifth Amendment rights were violated because they
were deprived of their property without due process.70  They supported
this claim by looking to a concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy in
Eastern Enters. v. Apfel,71 where he stated that retroactive legislation that
upsets people’s expectations is a violation of due process.72
The district court initially granted a summary judgment motion for
the government, rejecting each argument of the musicians.73  However,
on appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the decision on the First Amend-
ment claim, accepting the musicians’ argument that First Amendment
scrutiny was necessary because one of the “traditional contours” of cop-
yright law was that works in the public domain stay there, and § 514 of
the URAA upsets this principle.74  The Tenth Circuit remanded the
case back to the district court, which this time found in favor of the
musicians, holding that while § 514 of the URAA was a content-neutral
restriction, it did burden substantially more speech than was necessary
to meet a legitimate government interest.75  On appeal by the govern-
ment, the Tenth Circuit rejected the district court’s determination that
the § 514 of the URAA violated the musicians’ First Amendment
because the provisions were narrowly tailored and did not burden more
speech than was necessary.76  Dissatisfied with the verdict, the musicians
successfully petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, and oral argu-
ments were heard on October 5, 2011.
B. The Public Domain is Not Inviolable—The Supreme Court Decision
On January 18, 2012 over a decade of litigation would end as the
Supreme Court released a six to two decision in favor of the govern-
ment.77  Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion and all the other
Justices joined her opinion except Justices Stephen Breyer and Samuel
Alito who dissented and Justice Elena Kagan who did not take part in
the decision of the case.  Ginsburg’s opinion addressed both the Copy-
right Clause claim and the First Amendment claim of the musicians.
In rejecting the musicians’ claim that § 514 of the URAA violated
the Copyright Clause, Justice Ginsburg relied heavily on the court’s ear-
70. Id.
71. Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Golan
v. Asoft. 2d 1215, 1217 trade agreementsing the results of hte ion. better protection for
72. Golan, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 1220.
73. Golan v. Gonzales, No. Civ.01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 WL 914754 (D. Colo. Sept. 4,
2007).
74. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1191–92 (10th Cir. 2007).  The court noted
that outside a few exceptional circumstances that occurred just following each of the two
World Wars, there is little history of Congress affording copyright protection to works in
the public domain. Id.
75. Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (D. Colo. 2009) (finding that the
U.S. went further than other nations that implemented the Berne Convention, and that
the Act treated foreign authors more favorably than domestic authors).
76. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that Congress
intended to protect the rights of domestic authors and rationally believed that restoring
copyrights for foreign authors could induce their countries to do the same for domestic
authors).
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lier decision in Eldred. She noted that Eldred established, for purposes
of the Copyright Clause, that “limited” is to be interpreted as “con-
fine[d] within certain bounds.”78  Under that definition, the restored
copyrights were sufficiently limited because they would eventually
end.79  Additionally, the majority opinion also cites several statutes
from the original Copyright Act of 1790 to late nineteenth century stat-
utes to mid twentieth century statutes that Justice Ginsburg argued
granted copyrights to works in the public domain.80  Expanding on the
holding in Eldred, Justice Ginsburg argued that the Copyright Clause is
not confined to simply incentivizing new creation, but rather extends to
efforts to encourage dissemination of information.81  With dissemina-
tion considered an appropriate goal of copyright laws, she further
argued that it is rational to consider that Congress believed strict adher-
ence to the Berne Convention would result in achieving that end.82
Indeed, in the last section of the opinion, the Court noted that they are
not ruling on the wisdom of the URAA, but rather that the law is within
the power of Congress.83
Unlike the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court rejected the idea
that § 514 of the URAA warranted heightened scrutiny under the First
Amendment, noting that the “traditional contours” of copyright protec-
tion, only protecting expressions, not facts, and preserving the fair use
of works, are not affected by § 514 of the URAA.84  The Court took
particular issue with the argument of the musicians and the portion of
the Tenth Circuit’s holding that the public’s right to a work vests when
it enters the public domain.  Citing 17 U.S.C § 201(a), which governs
the initial ownership of copyrights, Justice Ginsburg noted that under
statutory law, rights vest initially with the author of a work.85  She noted
that rights do not vest in the public following the expiration of the cop-
yright term; the work “simply lapse[s] into the public domain” and no
one has any ownership rights to it anymore.86  Despite the loss of free,
unrestricted access to the affected works, the Court held that Congress
did not violate the musicians’ First Amendment rights because they still
have access to the works through either fair use or obtaining a license
through the marketplace.87
78. Id. at 884.
79. The Court additionally noted that foreign authors would receive fewer years of
exclusivity than domestic authors because they receive no credit for the time in which
their works were not protected by copyright. Id. at 878.
80. Id. at 885–87.
81. Id. at 888.
82. Id. at 889.
83. Id. at 894.
84. Id. at 890–91.
85. Id. at 892.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 892–93. The Court noted that the net effect of the URAA is to place
foreign works on the same level as domestic works.  In particular, it noted that works of
Aaron Copland and Leonard Bernstein were always subject to copyright protection in the
United States, but the works of their contemporary, Sergei Prokofiev, were not protected
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III. HOW THE COURT’S RULING FITS INTO HISTORY AND PRACTICE
A. Utilitarian, Yet Grounded in Natural Rights
One of the most interesting aspects of the Golan opinion was how
the Court addressed the various competing theoretical justifications for
copyright law.  Both opinions attempt to justify their conclusion as
being consistent with utilitarian theory.  This theory of copyright law
posits that it exists because the public benefits by receiving access to
creative works.88  The utilitarian theory was supported by the majority
of the Founding Fathers and is reflected in the text and the dissent’s
historical interpretation of the Copyright Clause.89
Where the two opinions diverge is on what exactly qualifies as a
valid utilitarian end.  Justice Breyer’s opinion takes the position that the
Copyright Clause mandates new copyright laws to provide some possi-
ble incentive for the creation of new work.90  Justice Ginsburg, on the
other hand, believes that history suggests encouraging dissemination is
a valid end to copyright law, even in the absence of promoting the crea-
tion of new works.91  In particular, she cites the fact that until the Copy-
right Act of 1976, federal statutory copyright required publication of
the work.92
A close textual comparison of the Statute of Anne, the Copyright
Clause, and the Copyright Act of 1790 supports Justice Ginsburg’s posi-
tion.  The text of the Statute of Anne plainly states Parliament passed it
for “the encouragement of learned men to compose and write useful
books.”93  Despite their strong influence on early American copyright
law,94 both the Copyright Clause and the Copyright Act of 1790 speak
only to “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and the useful Arts”95 and
the “encouragement of learning.”96  Neither text, unlike the Statute of
Anne, directly mentions encouraging the composition or creation of
new works.  Indeed, the Copyright Act of 1790 extended copyright pro-
tection to existing works, conditioned upon filing copies with the fed-
eral government for recording and preservation.97
Although both Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer base their opin-
ions on their understanding of utilitarian theory, Justice Ginsburg also
makes several arguments that are highly influenced by the competing
88. Thomas M. Byron, As Long As There’s Another Way: Pivot Point v. Charlene Products
as an Accidental Template for Creativity-Driven Useful Articles Analysis, 49 IDEA 147, 154–55
(2009).
89. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 901–02 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
90. Id. at 899–900.
91. Id. at 888–89.
92. Id.
93. The Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, c. 19 (1710).  It should be noted, however, that
the Statute did convey the same benefits to existing, but unpublished works as it did to
works yet to be created and also mandated that copies of texts be deposited in various
libraries in England and Scotland.
94. See supra Part I.
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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natural rights justifications for copyright law.  The natural rights theory
suggests that copyrights should exist because man has a property inter-
est in the fruit of his labor and that property interest should trump
societal concerns.98  In rejecting the musicians’ claim that their First
Amendment rights were violated by the restoration of copyrights to cer-
tain materials in the public domain, Justice Ginsburg used a fairness
argument, noting that the URAA simply treated foreign composers in
the same manner as their domestic contemporaries.99  Specifically, her
opinion speaks of authors being “deprived of protection” and “spared”
further deprivation and makes comparisons between the rights enjoyed
by foreign and domestic authors.100
The influence of natural rights theory on copyrights in the Anglo-
sphere is hardly new.  The utilitarian Statute of Anne notes the “Detri-
ment” and “Ruin” authors faced when others published their works
without their consent.101  While the Copyright Clause is unquestionably
utilitarian, for much of American history, natural rights concerns have
also been part of the debate surrounding copyright law.102
Both utilitarian and natural rights arguments were put forth dur-
ing the debate of the Copyright Act of 1831, which provided for the first
term extension following the initial Copyright Act of 1790.103  Indeed,
while utilitarian concerns were raised, one of the primary motivations
behind the law’s lengthening of the copyright term was to place Ameri-
can authors on a more equal footing with their counterparts in
Europe.104  This law, in many ways, was highly influenced by both utili-
tarian and natural rights concerns.105
At the turn of the twentieth century, during the debates surround-
ing what would become the Copyright Act of 1909, both natural rights
and utilitarian arguments were made to recommend expansion of the
copyright term.106  One scholar, however, argues that utilitarian argu-
ments were controlling because the text of the final House Report as
98. Orit Fischman Afori, Note, Human Rights and Copyright: The Introduction of Natu-
ral Law Considerations into American Copyright Law, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 497, 502–04 (2004).
99. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 893 (2012).
100. Id.
101. Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, c. 19 (1710).
102. Afori, supra note 98, at 505.
103. Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution: A Histor-
ical Perspective, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 19, 30–31 (2001).
104. Id.  Notably, at that time France had already adopted a copyright term of the
life of the author plus fifty years. Id. at 31 n.59.  The United States would later adopt this
term in 1976.  Copyright Act of 1976, ch. 3, § 302(a), 90 Stat. 2541.
105. See Patrick H. Haggerty, The Constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1998, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 651, 656 (2002) (noting that the renewal provi-
sion of the 1831 Act granted authors a lengthened term and granted their family the right
to renew in the event they died before renewal came up, but also noting that where the
author or his decedents declined to renew, the public received access to the work after
the initial term expired).
106. S. REP. NO. 6187, at 6 (1907).  The natural rights arguments included provid-
ing for the author for old age and his children until they are able to support themselves.
The utilitarian arguments encouraged the author to revise his works and only set the term
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well as statements on the floor by Rep. Frank Currier, Chairman of the
House Committee on Patents, plainly reject the natural rights justifica-
tions for copyright law in the United states.107  Despite this language in
the report accompanying the final bill, just two years earlier a Senate
report clearly invoking the natural rights justification for copyrights
argued the Statute of Anne was passed to grant authors a “more definite
remedy” for the infringement of their right to their work and that the
U.S. Constitution did not authorize Congress to “grant” copyrights, but
rather to “secure” them.108  Similarly, both in a preliminary report in
1907 and in their final report, the House included comments made by
President Roosevelt in an address to Congress in 1905 urging a revision
of the then existing copyright laws because certain unprotected classes
of works were “entitled” to receive copyright protection and “hardships”
that unduly burden content producers and serve no public interest
function should be eliminated.109
The influence of the natural rights theory on American copyright
law is even more apparent with the debate surrounding the two most
recent term extensions, the Copyright Act of 1976 and the Copyright
Term Extension Act (CTEA) in 1998.  As with the earlier 1909 Act, in
justifying the 1976 Act, Congress again professed a utilitarian motive.110
Indeed, one congressman campaigned against a series of interim term
extensions passed while the 1976 Act was debated because he could not
find any public benefit in the extensions.111  Despite this sentiment,
natural rights arguments again were plentiful.  Both houses justified the
need for the increased term of the 1976 Act in part because of increases
in life expectancy, the perceived unfairness in depriving authors of
available economic benefits from their work, the increase in the com-
mercial life of works, and the possibility of further benefiting authors by
joining the Berne Convention.112
Twenty-two years later, when Congress again extended copyrights
by passing the CTEA, natural rights arguments so predominated the
discussion that one scholar classified the constitutionally mandated util-
itarian justification as merely “an apparent afterthought.”113  Indeed,
the House noted that the CTEA ensured that the United States (and its
authors and rights holders) would not lose out on potential export rev-
enue, placed European and American authors on equal footing, and
ensured that authors’ children and grandchildren could benefit eco-
terms should be long enough to provide for authors at old age when the author “needs it
the most.”).
107. Dallon, supra note 25, at 434–35.
108. S. REP. NO. 6187, at 8 (1907).
109. H.R. REP. NO. 7083, at 1 (1907); H.R. REP NO. 2222, at 1–2 (1909) (Message to
Congress, December 1905 by President Roosevelt).
110. Dallon, supra note 25, at 436 (discussing statements made by Sen. John Little
McClellan, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copy-
rights that his “sole objective” was to “encourage creativity” and promote public interest).
111. Ochoa, supra note 103, at 41–42 (noting that Robert Kastenmeir found it
“impossible” to find a public benefit to an interim term extension.)
112. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 134–35 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 116–18 (1976).
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nomically from the work.114  Similarly, the Senate considering a compa-
rable bill two years earlier noted that authors “deserve[d] to benefit
fully” from their works, and extending the term of protection an addi-
tional twenty years would help ensure that would happen.115
Given the prominence of natural rights arguments during the vari-
ous copyright law extensions of the last century, it is hardly surprising
that the URAA, which restored copyrights for certain foreign works and
was the statute at issue in Golan, shows a similar influence.  One of the
primary justifications for passing the law, echoed by everyone from sen-
ators and executive branch officials to the heads of industry groups, was
that American rights holders stood to benefit economically from grant-
ing retroactive copyrights.116  Another justification for the law was that
it was good policy because it rectified an unfair situation where foreign
authors were deprived something that was theirs.117  However, it was
also recognized that the Constitution mandates that copyright law
taken as a whole have a utilitarian end.118  One law professor, testifying
before Congress, noted that this constitutional requirement was satis-
fied because passing the URAA would strengthen the international cop-
yright system and indirectly provide incentives to create new works.119
Much of the concern about the constitutionality of this legislation was
not over whether it satisfied the utilitarian mandate of the Copyright
Clause, but rather whether the legislation violated the Takings
Clause.120
Considered historically, it is hardly surprising that Justice Ginsburg
uses both natural rights and utilitarian arguments to support her con-
clusion.  While commonly present alongside utilitarian justifications for
much of American history, they have taken on an increased promi-
114. H.R. REP. NO. 105-452, at 4 (1998). They did also mention a utilitarian argu-
ment suggesting that the lengthened term of the CTEA would encourage further
creation.
115. S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 3 (1996). The Senate also suggested that this term
extension would enhance the public domain through stimulating the creation of new
works, however, given the length of copyright terms with that extension (the life of the
author plus seventy years), it is likely that few if any living today will be able to fully reap
the benefits of this “enhanced” public domain. Id.
116. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): Intellectual Property Provisions: Joint
Hearings on S. 2368 and H.R. 4894 Before the Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial
Administration of House Committee on the Judiciary and Subcommittee on Patent and Trademarks
of the Senate Committee of the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 81 (1994) [hereinafter GATT] (statement
of Sen. Deconcini) (“The conventional wisdom . . . is . . . we will get more than we give
because U.S. authors will be able to retrieve far more works in foreign countries than
foreign authors will retrieve here in the United States.”). See also id. at 171–72 (statement
of Ira Shapiro, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative). See also id. at 255–57 (statement
of Jack Valenti, President and CEO of the MPAA).
117. Id. at 190–92 (statement of Prof. Shira Perlmutter).
118. Id. at 207.
119. Id. at 207–08.  Justice Ginsburg cites several of Prof. Perlmutter’s arguments
that claim the URAA satisfies the utilitarian mandate in her Golan opinion.  Golan v.
Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888–89 (2012).
120. GATT, supra note 116, at 145, 150–62 (Statement and prepared testimony of
Christopher Schroeder, Office of Legal Counsel, Dept. of Justice).  Justice Ginsberg
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nence in the debates over our most recent copyright and intellectual
property legislation.  Indeed, her understanding of utilitarianism,
though supported by history, almost invites such debates.
B. Removing Works From the Public Domain—Unprecedented,
But Not Unheard Of
Although there was much public outcry about the effects of the
URAA, what is groundbreaking about the law is not the idea of remov-
ing works from the public domain, but rather the fact that Congress
actually did so on such a large scale, and the Court deemed doing so
constitutional.  Justice Breyer’s dissent noted that until the URAA there
was a “virtually unbroken string of legislation preventing the withdrawal
of works from the public domain.”121  Indeed, the Tenth Circuit in one
of the intermediary appeals of the case held that it is a “bedrock princi-
ple of copyright law that works in the public domain remain there” and
that “§ 514 [of the URAA] alters the traditional contours of copyright
protection by deviating from this principle.”122  The fact that the public
domain exists at all is not a matter of legislative grace, but rather is
constitutionally mandated.  Although not expressly prescribed in the
document, its existence can be inferred because by restricting the
monopoly granted to content creators to “limited Times,” the Constitu-
tion ensures that eventually one day the public will have free access to
works.123  Even ardent supporters of personal property rights, such as
John Locke, recognized that there had to be a limit to the protection of
intellectual property because one can hardly have any legitimate claim
to property rights in a work written by someone who lived over a thou-
sand years ago.124
As Justice Ginsburg’s opinion claims and Justice Breyer grudgingly
accepts,125 the removal of works from the public domain is not com-
pletely without precedent.  Her opinion cites the original Copyright Act
of 1790, several private letter laws, and statutes passed following the
First and Second World Wars as proof of this precedent.126  She argues
that the United States’ joining of the Berne Convention is an excep-
tional event that is on par with these other occasions where works were
taken out of the public domain.127  However, examining both the his-
torical context and the scope of prior copyright restorations demon-
strates, as Justice Breyer argues, just how exceptional the URAA is.128
121. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 909 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
122. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d. 1179, 1187–88 (10th Cir. 2007).
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
124. BENJAMIN RAND, THE CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN LOCKE AND EDWARD CLARKE
177 (1975) (cited in Dallon, supra note 25, at 400–01).  To Locke, a laborer’s right to the
fruits of his labor finds justification not in the laws of man, but in the law of God.  He
believed that through using one’s labor to transform something from the state of nature,
we become forever joined with the target of our labor and have near unlimited rights over
it unless others are in need. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT § 27 (1690).
125. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 908–09 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 885–87.
127. Id. at 887.
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The nation’s first federal copyright statute, the Copyright Act of
1790 was passed a mere one year following the ratification of the Consti-
tution.129  Prior to this, copyright was a state matter which required
obtaining separate copyrights in each of the states that recognized it.130
In ratifying the Constitution, the States ceded elements of sovereignty
to the new federal government.  Their fundamental existence was for-
ever changed.  New federal laws that harmonized the patchwork of state
laws were expected.  The statutes passed following the World Wars only
applied to nationals of countries where U.S. copyright interests were
protected on a reciprocal basis.131  Further, they merely allowed
authors the opportunity to comply with the required American formali-
ties if they were unable to do so because of the war.132
The context and scope of the URAA could hardly be any more
different than the Copyright Act of 1790 or the wartime restorations.
First, unlike the wartime restorations, the URAA applies to works cre-
ated in any Berne signatory country, even if at the time of a work’s
creation there were no reciprocal copyright arrangements or any expec-
tation of copyright protection in the United States.133  Second, the Act
in some cases impacts works created over eighty years ago and applies
to works created over several decades, rather than just a few short
years.134  Last, while joining the Berne Convention may have been a
seminal event for copyright scholars and rights holders, it is hardly the
wholesale revolution that accompanied the adoption of the U.S.
Constitution.
Much weight should be given to Breyer’s argument that among
other acts, the Copyright Acts of 1831,135 1909,136 and 1976,137
129. The First United States Congress passed the Act during its second session on
May 31, 1790. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 142.
130. Kevin D. Galbraith, Note, Forever on the Installment Plan? An Examination of the
Constitutional History of the Copyright Clause and Whether the Copyright Term Extension Act of
1998 Squares with the Founders’ Intent, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1119,
1136–37 (2002) (Delaware did not enact copyright legislation.).
131. See ch. 11, 41 Stat. 368 (1919) (“When the foreign State . . . grants . . . to
citizens of the United States the benefit of copyright on substantially the same basis as to
its own citizens”); ch. 421, 55 Stat. 732 (1941) (“who are nationals of countries which
accord substantially equal treatment in this respect to authors, copyright owners, or pro-
prietors who are citizens of the United States”).
132. Id. Justice Ginsberg also noted that this was one of the arguments of the musi-
cians, but rejected it as she believed that the World Wars were on par with creating the
nation’s first copyright system and joining the Berne Convention. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887
n.24.
133. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(C) (2006).
134. Dale Nelson, Golan Restoration: Small Burden, Big Gains. 64 VAND. L. REV. EN
BANC 165, 170 (2011) (noting that the act affects works from certain countries produced
after 1923 but before 1955, 1964, or 1972 depending on the subject matter).
135. Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436, 439.  (“Provided, That this section
shall not extend to any copyright heretofore secured, the term of which has already
expired.”).
136. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077.  (“That no copyright shall
subsist in the original text of any work which is in the public domain.”).
137. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94–553, § 303, 90 Stat. 2541, 2573 (“[B]ut not
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expressly preclude applicability of the term extension contained
therein to works in the public domain.138  Indeed, while Congress was
working on a wholesale revision of copyright law that would ultimately
become the 1976 Act, they passed a series of short-term term extensions
to ensure that the works would receive the benefit of the long-term
term extension they were contemplating.139  Some felt that this demon-
strated that Congress believed they lacked the power to restore copy-
rights to works in the public domain.140
While after the first federal copyright statute, Congress never
removed works from the public domain on the scale that they did in the
URAA, the idea of doing so and granting foreign authors retroactive
copyright protection is hardly news.  In 1946, the United States signed
the Inter-American Convention on the Rights of the Author in Literary,
Scientific, and Artistic Works.141  This was a treaty with Latin American
nations that provided for retroactive copyrights for foreign works that
entered into the public domain due to a failure to comply with the
required U.S. copyright formalities.142  Despite the fact that the Con-
vention was signed in Washington, D.C. by twenty-one member states of
the Pan American Union,143 the Senate never ratified the treaty, in part
due to concerns over retroactivity.144
Similarly, membership in the Berne Convention was under serious
consideration for most of the twentieth century.  In 1935, the Senate
approved the U.S. joining the Convention, but later withdrew their
approval until copyright law could be amended to comply with the Con-
vention’s requirements.145  Four decades later, when Congress signifi-
cantly revised copyright law with the Copyright Act of 1976, the
possibility of future membership in the Berne Convention was cited by
Congress as one of the reasons for the extension of the copyright
term.146  Although the issue of retroactive copyrights was initially not
addressed when the United States ultimately joined the Berne Conven-
tion in 1988, the Congressional working group set up to study U.S.
adherence to the Convention noted that addressing it was necessary for
U.S. rights holders to gain the protection of the Convention, but that it
also raised practical, legal, and constitutional issues.147  Indeed, in a
prepared statement before a congressional committee considering the
138. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 909 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
139. Ochoa, supra note 103, at 40-41.
140. Id. at 42.
141. Note, The Inter-American Copyright Convention: Its Place in United States Copyright
Law, 60 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1329 n.1 (1947).
142. Id. at 1333.
143. Id. at 1329 n.1.
144. Comment, International Copyright Protection and the United States: The Impact of the
UNESCO Universal Copyright Convention on Existing Law, 62 YALE L.J. 1065, 1072 (1953).
145. Melville Nimmer, Implications of the Prospective Revisions of the Berne Convention
and the United States Copyright Law, 19 STAN. L. REV. 499, 548 (1967).
146. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 135 (1976).
147. Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention,
10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513, 587 (1986) (cited in Edward Samuels, The Public Domain
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URAA, a representative of the Office of Legal Counsel noted that pass-
ing a law affording retroactive copyright protection to foreign authors
was inevitable.148
In a sense, both Justices Ginsburg and Breyer are correct in their
interpretation of the historical precedent in removing works from the
public domain.  While no statute since the initial federal copyright stat-
ute had removed works from the public domain on the scale of the
URAA, the idea of doing so has existed for most of the twentieth cen-
tury.  The actions were without precedent, but any party closely follow-
ing developments in copyright law would have been placed on notice
that this was a real possibility.
IV. THE STATUS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN FOLLOWING
GOLAN V. HOLDER
The Supreme Court first used the phrase “public domain” to
describe intellectual property in 1896.149  Prior to this, terms used to
describe real property, such as “public property” or  “common prop-
erty,” were commonly used to refer to the same body of works.150
Although the change in the terms used may appear to be merely super-
ficial, it is potentially significant.  As one scholar noted, the first edition
of Black’s Law Dictionary, released in 1891 (before the application of the
term “public domain” to intellectual property), defines public property
as that which is “considered as being owned by ‘the public.’”151  Today,
however there is much debate over the exact meaning of the phrase
“public domain.”  Some scholars argue that applying the term to a work
can signify a lack of private ownership to the work, a right of public use,
or both.152 Although in most situations, the answer to this question has
little impact on those that use the public domain, the URAA and cases
like Golan demonstrate why the answer is important.
During the debate surrounding the URAA, Congress operated
under the assumption that no one had a property right to works in the
public domain.153  As one scholar noted, however, not all courts neces-
sarily share this view and instead, strongly imply that everyone rather
148. GATT supra note 116, at 157 (Prepared Statement of Christopher Schroder,
Office of Legal Counsel)  (“[I]t should have been apparent . . . that something very simi-
lar to draft section 104A would be passed to provide more vigorous implementation of
the Berne Convention.”)
149. Vincenzo Vinciguerra, Contribution to the Understanding of the Public Domain, 24
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 411, 424 (2006).
150. Id. at 414.
151. Tyler Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV.
215, 236–37 (2002) (emphasis added).
152. Mary Wong, Toward an Alternative Normative Framework for Copyright: From Private
Property to Human Rights, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 775, 789 (2009). See also
Vinciguerra, supra note 149, at 416 (noting that this term has been defined as the oppo-
site of copyright).
153. GATT, supra note 116, at 151 (prepared statement of Christopher Schroder,
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than no one owns the public domain.154  Indeed, in this case the dis-
trict court in addressing the musicians’ claim that the URAA violated
the Copyright Clause held that ideas remain “public property,” even if
the rights to fully express those ideas are vested solely in the creator.155
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Golan firmly rejects any idea of own-
ership rights to works in the public domain without any reference to
the ongoing dispute.156  The only sources that she cites to support this
proposition are ambiguous and do not directly speak to any ownership
or lack of ownership by the public in the work.157  While she cites the
Copyright Act of 1976 to argue that rights only vest in authors at the
time of creation,158 the Act itself is silent as to the status of works whose
copyright term has expired and uses the phrase “public domain” only
twice in the entire act and does so in reference to works excluded from
the scope of copyright protection.159  Likewise, she cites Article 18 of
the Berne Convention to claim that rights to works do not re-vest in the
general public, but rather that upon expiration of the copyright term,
works “fall[ ] into the public domain.”160  Again, this language fails to
state anything concerning property rights, and it is hard to see how a
treaty the United States joined in 1988 should be used to construe
nearly two centuries of common law precedent and a statute passed in
1976.  Indeed, this phrase exists nowhere in the Copyright Act of
1976161 or in the URAA.162
The dissenting opinion also uses the phrase “fallen into the public
domain” in its discussion of copyrights, but does not make the same
claim about property rights that the majority opinion did.163  Instead, it
recognizes that the public had some belief that they had ownership
rights to works in the public domain and implies that those rights may
exist, but are less “well-established” than other property rights.164  Jus-
tice Breyer makes no reference to Justice Ginsburg’s statement about a
lack of ownership rights at any place in his opinion.
Despite the shaky foundation, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion could not
be clearer: the Supreme Court does not recognize property rights in
the public domain.  The parties most impacted by this are those who
have created derivative works using source material that was at the time
in the public domain, but is no longer.  The URAA takes away their
154. Ochoa, supra note 151, at 260 (noting that recent court decisions have used
the terms “public property” or “common property” along with other language that
implies public ownership).
155. Golan v. Gonzalez, No. Civ.01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 WL 914754, at *14 (D. Colo.
Sept. 4, 2007).
156. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 892 (2012) (“[N]o one, after the copyright
term has expired, acquires ownership rights in the once-protected works.”).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94–533, 90 Stat. 2541.
160. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 892.
161. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-533, 90 Stat 2541.
162. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
163. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 903.
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right to exploit their own work without paying for the right to use to the
underlying source material.165  This was one of Congress’s biggest con-
cerns with passing the URAA and one of the primary reasons behind
the inclusion of accommodations for parties who had previously used
the work.166  It should be noted that the musicians never argued about
losing access to a derivative work they created,167 and did not challenge
the district court granting summary judgment, rejecting their due pro-
cess claims.168  Time will tell if any creators of a derivative work try to
argue a takings claim, as Congress feared.
However harsh this decision may appear, the Court earlier took an
even harder line to those who created derivative works under the Copy-
right Act of 1909.  Under that Act, because copyrights were granted for
two separate terms subject to renewal, it was necessary to secure the
right to make a derivative work separately during both terms.169  In
Stewart v. Abend, an author granted the petitioner the right to create a
derivative work during the first term and promised to do so again in the
second term, but died before he could grant the right during the
renewal term.170  The Court declined to follow an earlier Second Cir-
cuit decision based off of similar facts, where the court determined that
equitable reasons allowed the creator of the derivative work the right to
continue exploiting the derivative work.171  Instead, they rigidly applied
property and copyright law and noted that a party who relies on an
expectation of renewal does so at the risk the renewal may not occur.172
From Golan and Stewart, one principle emerges: those who choose
to create derivative works do so at their own peril.  It matters not what
the creator’s reasonable expectations of free access to the work were at
the time their derivative work was created.  The Court is willing to
ignore equity and strictly apply statutory copyright law so as not to
deprive the creator of the source work their rights under law.
CONCLUSION
Following oral arguments, there was much speculation as to how
the Court would rule in Golan.  Court watchers were prepared for every
possible outcome including a four-to-four tie.173  What the Court ulti-
mately decided, however, is perhaps best described as a continuation
165. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976
(1994).
166. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 892 n.33.
167. Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1220 (2004). The musicians’ claim
was based upon loss of access to works that were once in the public domain.
168. Golan, 132 S. Ct at 883 n.15.
169. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.  This is no longer the case today
under the Copyright Act of 1976 as amended by the CTEA which grants a single term of
protection with no renewal provisions.
170. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 212 (1990).
171. Id. at 221–23.
172. Id. at 219–21.
173. Justice Kagan worked on this case as Solicitor General and did not take part in
the proceedings. See Adam Liptak, In Supreme Court Argument, a Rock Legend Plays a Role,
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and expansion of their earlier decision in Eldred. Indeed, Justice Gins-
burg wrote both opinions and frequently cites Eldred in her Golan opin-
ion.  Her opinion is faithful to precedent, yet disrupts established
expectations concerning access to works in the public domain.
Undoubtedly one effect of Eldred and Golan is an increase in the
power and deference given to Congress when enacting legislation sub-
ject to the Copyright Clause.  The Court has made it clear that they will
continue to consider copyright laws as a whole in determining their
constitutionality.174  In many ways, this can be considered to be a virtual
evisceration of the utilitarian mandate of the Copyright Clause.  It is
hard to conceive of a copyright regime that could not be said to
encourage the creation of new works or the dissemination of existing
ones.
This evisceration of the utilitarian mandate in many ways reflects
the growing influence of the natural rights theory over the twentieth
century.  This change is perhaps best seen in the United States joining
the Berne Convention, an international copyright regime grounded in
the natural rights philosophy.  Despite this, it is unlikely that Congress
would be so bold as to test the waters and try and pass a new copyright
statute without making some claim of it serving a utilitarian end.  Even
so, the Court has shown that they will give Congress tremendous defer-
ence in interpreting such claim.
After this opinion, the only real limitation that appears on Con-
gress’s power is that any copyright law must provide for a fixed expira-
tion date at some point in the future.  It is of no consequence if that
expiration date had been extended multiple times, it would have
resulted in some cases from an author expecting to secure only fifty-six
years of protection following publication (if they exercised their
renewal right) to a copyright that persists not just during their entire
lifetime, but also during their grandchildren’s entire lifetimes.  If
recent history is any indication, authors can expect to receive yet
another term extension, and the Court will uphold it.175
While Golan stood for the proposition that Congress could grant
copyrights to works in the public domain, it only applied to a large but
discrete number of works. Golan merely gave these works the term of
protection they could have expected had they been eligible for copy-
right protection in the U.S. at the time of creation and complied with
all the necessary formalities.  This opinion should not be interpreted as
standing for the idea that Congress has the power to remove anything
from the public domain.  The utilitarian and natural rights theories
that underlie Golan seem to imply that there has to be some limit to this
authority after the right holder becomes too attenuated from the
creator.
Finally, it is notable that due to turnover on the Court, only five
Justices heard both Golan and Eldred, but in both cases only one other
174. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012).
175. Indeed, Mary Bono argued (perhaps jokingly) for a copyright term of “forever
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Justice in dissent joined Justice Breyer.176  Both decisions had the sup-
port of the majority of the Court’s “conservative” wing and a plurality of
the “liberal” wing.  In short, barring some massive shift over the next
decade as four of the Justices currently over seventy decide to retire, it is
unlikely the Court will back off of their holding.  This new era of copy-
right law appears to be around for quite some time.
176. Justice Stevens, who filed a separate dissenting opinion in Eldred v. Ashcroft,
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